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The transformation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights into a 
‘standard for civilisation’ has not been without consequences. With LGBT Pride parades 
becoming a symbol for Europeanness in the European Union (EU) accession process, this 
article asks how the litmus test character of Belgrade Pride has transformed LGBT 
politics in Serbia. Empirically, the analysis provides an in-depth analysis of how Serbia’s 
EU accession process has shaped the politics of Belgrade Pride between 2001 and 2015 
and vice versa. It is argued that the international symbolic usage of Pride is no innocent 
practice as it has foreclosed its local politicality. Indeed, whilst Belgrade Pride became 
politicised as a litmus test in the EU accession process, domestically it developed into an 
apolitical ritualised event devoid of LGBT politics. 
Introduction 
In recent years, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) rights have seemingly 
developed into what Roth (2014) has called the “proverbial canary in the coal mine” for 
countries’ human rights records. A process which has taken place against the broader 
backdrop of the globalisation of human rights discourses (Stychin 2004). According to 
Donnelly (1998, 21), human rights “represent a progressive [contemporary] expression of the 
important idea that international legitimacy and full membership in the international society 
must rest in part on standards of just, humane or civilized behaviour.” With LGBT rights now 
incorporated within the international human rights architecture, they came to be a norm 
against which countries are judged (Ammaturo 2017; Kollman and Waites 2009; Paternotte 
and Seckinelgin 2015). Puar (2007) conceptualised this phenomenon by coining 
‘homonationalism,’ a term which in effect captures the process or geopolitical context in 
which respect for LGBT rights have developed in, what English school scholars (see e.g. Bull 
1977; Buzan 2014) would label, a ‘standard of civilisation’ used to evaluate the international 
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legitimacy of a country. This process is particularly observable in the international politics of 
LGBT Pride parades. Consider, for example, the European Union (EU) enlargement process 
in which Pride events have emerged as a symbolic marker of these countries’ readiness to 
access the EU (Ammaturo 2017; Slootmaeckers and Touquet 2016). In fact, the ability of 
LGBT people to carry out their right to the freedom of assembly is used as a litmus test of 
Europeanness. To illustrate, (former) EU Commissioner Füle (2014) called the 2014 Pride in 
Belgrade a “milestone in the modern history of democratic Serbia,” and Member of the 
European Parliament (MEP) Tanja Fajon said: “The values of tolerance and diversity that 
will be highlighted this Sunday [during Belgrade Pride] are European, and Serbia fully 
belongs in Europe” (quoted in Intergroup on LGBT Rights 2014). 
However, linking LGBT rights to the appealing idea of Europeanness is said to be “far from 
[…] a harmless operation [… with potentially] huge political and social implications” 
(Ammaturo 2017, 93). This being the case, the practice of using Pride as a litmus test for 
Europeanness cannot be taken for granted as an unalloyed good, and must thus be critically 
examined. Such critical examination of the political implications of international usage of 
LGBT rights and Pride as litmus test is the main focus of the presented analysis. Starting 
from observation that Pride is inherently a local orientated phenomenon — it is a tactic of 
domestic LGBT activists —, this article asks: how does the international symbolism of Pride 
shape its domestic politics?  
By providing rich empirical material and an in-depth longitudinal critical analysis of the 
relational nature of the international and national politics of the Belgrade Pride and its 
consequences for the event’s local politicality, the article adds to the emerging literature on 
LGBT and queer politics in the post-Yugoslav space (see e.g. Bilić 2016c; Rhodes-Kubiak 
2015). In addition to this empirical contribution, the article has important theoretical 
implications for at least three fields of social inquiry. First and foremost, the research 
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contributes to critical scholarship on the globalisation of LGBT rights by providing a much-
needed challenge to the presumed universality of Pride as a strategy for raising visibility. It is 
argued the EU’s practice of what Rahman (2014, 281) calls ‘pink-testing’ has a harmful 
impact on local LGBT people and politics. Second, in terms of the Europeanisation of LGBT 
rights literature, the presented analysis challenges the widespread belief that the EU has been 
a force of good that improved LGBT equality in candidate countries. Doing so, the analysis 
also furthers the recent ‘pathological turn’ of the more general Europeanisation via 
enlargement literature (see Mendelski 2016), despite not explicitly drawing on it. It is argued 
that that the domestic instrumentalisation and politicisation of reforms are not only a result 
the EU’s outcome-focussed monitoring mechanism, but also a product of the intertwining of 
national and international politics. It is the relational aspect of the politics encapsulated in the 
enlargement process that allows for the constant negotiation and reinterpretation of EU 
norms.  
Empirically, this article analyses the history of the Belgrade Pride between 2001 and 2015, 
focussing on how the Pride has been transformed as part of Serbia’s European integration 
process. These findings are based on a process-tracing analysis of the organisational process 
of the Belgrade Pride in relation to Serbia’s European integration process as well as the 
meaning of Pride within Serbian LGBT politics. A total of 89 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted between 2012 and 2016 with a variety of actors active within the field of 
LGBT politics in Serbia. This data is triangulated with data obtained through document 
analysis, most notably the EU Progress Reports, and through participant observation at the 
2015 Belgrade Pride. 
The article is structured in three parts. The first part situates the research in the wider 
literature, followed by a brief overview of the history of the Belgrade Pride between 2001 
and 2015. The last part of the article discusses how this history has contributed to a 
 4 
transformation of the Pride in which becomes devoid of domestic LGBT politics yet a 
political testimony of Europeanness on the international scene. 
Situating the Research 
The current scholarly debate on the domestic impact of the internationalisation of LGBT 
politics suggests that international pressure for LGBT rights can either hinder or promote 
LGBT rights, depending on a country’s orientation. Indeed, it has been argued that in those 
countries resisting the homonationalist interpretation of modernity, the international 
politicisation of LGBT rights has caused backlashes (Weiss and Bosia 2013; Wilkinson 
2014). The anti-gay propaganda laws in Russia and the so-called ‘Kill the Gays Bill’ in 
Uganda are only two examples in which the international push for LGBT rights has reduced 
the space for LGBT activism in the domestic arena. By contrast, it has been argued that the 
increased international politicisation and visibility of the LGBT norm can engender change 
— albeit not necessarily in a linear way — in those countries originally hostile to LGBT 
norms, especially when they are “embedded in international communities that champion an 
LGBT norm” (Ayoub 2016, 48).  
The growing literature on the impact of the EU enlargement on LGBT rights largely supports 
this argument by showing that the EU accession process has contributed to the adoption of 
new laws in candidate countries (Ayoub 2016; O'Dwyer 2012; Slootmaeckers, Touquet, and 
Vermeersch 2016). Although generally correct, the literature is potentially too optimistic in 
assessing how the EU enlargement process has shaped LGBT politics for at least two reasons. 
First, the current state of the literature has a predominant legal focus and employs an EU-
centric perspective, aligning itself with the notion that the EU enlargement is an asymmetric 
process in which candidate countries must (at least formally) comply with EU rules. 
Focussing on the top-down conceptions of Europeanisation (particularly relying on the 
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impact of the conditionality principle), the EU’s LGBT-friendliness is too often taken for 
granted with LGBT rights considered as non-negotiable conditions of EU membership (see 
e.g. O’Dwyer 2012). Such an approach, however, does not work for those issues which are 
not rooted in the EU acquis, as this article will demonstrate. In line with the work of Diez 
(2013), this article argues that EU’s LGBT equality norms are not simply passed on to 
candidate countries, but their meanings are reinterpreted and negotiated through the political 
process that underlays EU enlargement. Thus, rather than asking what the domestic impact of 
the EU Enlargement process on LGBT rights is, one should ask from a transnational 
perspective how the process configures the international and national politics and what 
outcomes this produces. 
A second reason why the existing literature might be too optimistic relates to its view on the 
international context. The previously mentioned notion that the international visibility of the 
LGBT norm is a ‘force of good’ when states seek to enter the LGBT-friendly international 
community might not accurately reflect reality, as the international context is not just a 
scoping condition but in fact actively shapes (and is shaped by) domestic LGBT politics. 
According to Rahman (2014, 279), Western sexual exceptionalism is triangulated through a 
homocolonialist process in which homonormative nationalism is deployed “within a dialectic 
of respectability/otherness in a classic colonializing mode, directed at ‘traditional’ 
[‘Eastern’/non-European] cultures as homophobic non-Western ‘others’ that need to be 
civilized or modernized but also constructing ‘home’ Western normative queer identities.” 
The importance of Rahman’s work lies in the fact that he argues that resistance to the sexual 
politics of the West is very much part of the triangulation process as it accepts the 
configuration of Western exceptionality. As such, sexual politics are located in the relation 
between the EU and the candidate countries, whereby the promotion of and resistance to 
LGBT equality produces political outcomes both at the international and domestic level, as 
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well as positions local LGBT activists in an awkward liminal position, i.e., stuck between the 
West-East dynamic created by the EU enlargement process. This being the case, one cannot 
just assume an always positive impact of international LGBT norm visibility —albeit with 
the recognition that visibility may initially increase hostility—, but one must analyse the EU 
enlargement process using a transnational approach, sensitive to its relational politics and 
conscious of the (potential) pathological consequences of these multiscalar LGBT politics. 
This is particularly the case when LGBT rights are used as a litmus test or a ‘standard of 
civilisation,’ as doing so is not a harmless operation. Indeed, the litmus test nature of Pride at 
the international level does not only contribute to the triangulation of Western 
exceptionalism, but, through the political integration process, also creates a domestic 
opportunity to transform the domestic politics of the event to serve the elite’s interests.  
Indeed, as Mendelski (2016) has shown when progress is measured by outcomes rather than 
by processes — as is done with a litmus test —, reforms might become ‘instrumentalised’ 
and politicised by local elites to serve ulterior motives. Hence, it is argued that the EU 
Enlargement’s homocolonialist practice of making LGBT rights, and particularly LGBT 
Pride, a ‘standard of civilisation’ or a litmus test for modernity and Europeanness produces 
important challenges for local LGBT activists and politics, leading to adoption of seemingly 
LGBT-friendly policies or actions that, whilst serving an international agenda, remain 
irrelevant for the advancement of LGBT equality in the domestic sphere.  
Although Europeanisation via enlargement has been a dominant framework of analysis when 
studying candidate EU members, this article does not draw from this literature as its tends to 
be relatively insensitive to the politics of enlargement and focuses too much on institutions. 
Indeed, this strand of literature would ask how the Enlargement process contributed to the 
occurrence of Pride, without considering how LGBT equality norms are reinterpreted and/or 
transformed by the process. In order to capture the latter, this article instead draws from the 
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recent work of Szulc (2018), who convincingly calls for a transnational approach to the study 
of LGBT politics in the former-communist regions. The multiscalar character of such an 
approach is indeed best suited for the purpose of this research as it does favour on level over 
the other, but rather takes the national and non-national as supplementary levels of analysis. 
Thus, rather than analysing a top-down impact of the international setting on the domestic 
politics, a transnational analysis highlights, as Szulc (2018, 10) rightfully notes, that “it is not 
those different scales separately but their combination and imbrication that created unique 
conditions, with unique opportunities and challenges, for lives and activisms of [local LGBT 
people].” As such, this article analyses how the specific combination of international and 
national LGBT politics as part of the European integration process has contributed to the 
reconfiguration of Belgrade Pride’s politics. 
Taking this into account, it is important to note at this point that whilst the EU may indeed 
have come to use Pride parades as a litmus test for the Europeanness (see e.g. Slootmaeckers 
and Touquet 2016), these events are not imposed on candidate countries per se. In fact, they 
only seem to enter the international agenda after local actors express an interest in organising 
it. Pride, then, is not a foreign-imposed event, but neither is it devoid of an international 
dimension. Pride events across the world remain deeply embedded in the history of ‘Western 
Pride’ as well as their current imagery. Acknowledging this reality, as well as the domestic 
origin of the desire to organise Pride, Pride is considered to be a local, yet vernacularised 
version of a globalised event (Thoreson 2014). Hence, one should not study how the EU 
enforces LGBT Pride on candidate countries, but rather examine how European pink-testing 
using Pride affects the domestic politics of Pride by reinscribing the international character of 
a practice that was previously vernacularised. 
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How Belgrade Pride Became a Litmus Test for Serbia’s Europeanness 
Due to the limitation of space, a complete year-by-year analysis of the history of the Belgrade 
Pride is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, based on such analysis presented 
elsewhere (see Slootmaeckers 2016), we can summarise its history into three distinct phases, 
which are each characterised by different configuration of domestic and international politics 
(see figure 1). Indeed, the data has indicated that throughout its history, Belgrade Pride has 
been subject to political calculations, both at the domestic and international levels. Whilst 
domestically, politicians made decisions on Pride based on their attempts to balance 
nationalist politics and Serbia’s EU aspirations, at the European scale, the EU reaction was 
determined by its need to offset regional stability and security with the promotion of human 
rights. 
 
[insert Figure 1 around here] 
 
During the first period of the history of Belgrade Pride, 2001–2009, Pride did not happen due 
to the strong presence of nationalism in Serbian politics and the inexperience of both 
organisers and state. The 2001 Pride was attacked by a thousand-strong crowd, for which 
neither organisers nor police were prepared. In the following years, the Kosovo issue and EU 
conditionality related to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) caused a resurgence of nationalism in Serbia, which in turn stopped any further 
attempt to organise Pride. It was only after the election of a pro-EU government and the 
adoption of the anti-discrimination legislation that activists thought it would be possible to 
organise Belgrade Pride again. Whereas activists framed the Pride as a political protest, they 
also strategically linked it to Serbia’s EU accession process. As such, the 2009 Pride was 
widely perceived, both domestically and internationally, as an important test of Serbia’s 
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maturity and its modernisation, as well the first real test of Serbia’s commitment to and the 
implementation of the newly adopted anti-discrimination law. However, activists 
overestimated the pro-EU character of the government. Although rhetorically trapped into 
supporting Pride, the government played on the inexperience of the organisers to bully them 
into cancelling the event (see Ejdus and Božović 2016). The 2009 Pride eventually was 
relocated by the government to the periphery of the city, in an attempt to balance the need to 
have the event with the wishes of the nationalist opposition against LGBT-visibility. This 
move, however, backfired on the government as both activists and international observers 
interpreted the relocation as an outright ban of the Pride, which in turn placed the Pride in the 
spotlight of the EU. Despite the fact that the official response in the EU’s Progress Report 
was rather mild, the behind-the-scenes pressure was to such an extent that Serbia’s EU 
accession process became linked to the organisation of the Belgrade Pride.  
This growing importance of the EU accession process as a factor in the state’s calculations on 
the Belgrade Pride characterises the second phase of the Pride’s history (2010–2013). For 
example, with the Council of the European Union’s decision on Serbia’s application for EU 
membership expected in fall 2010, supporting the 2010 Belgrade Pride became an important 
avenue for the Serbian government to showcase Serbia’s Europeanness (Mikuš 2011). As 
such, the 2010 Belgrade Pride was from the onset closely intertwined with Serbia’s EU 
accession process. On the one hand, EU support for the event was formalised when Vincent 
Degert, then head of the EU Delegation to Serbia, signed a petition to support the 2010 
Belgrade Pride (Gay Straight Alliance 2011). The Serbian government, on the other hand, 
also linked the Pride discursively to the EU integration process, as political leaders publicly 
expressed their support for Pride by explicitly linking it to the EU’s values. In fact, the 
government used the Pride so as to demonstrate its pro-EU credentials by seemingly co-
organising of the event. However, while the government indeed provided the conditions for 
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Pride to happen, it did not take any preventative measures to stop the anti-gay riots that 
followed 2010 Pride from happening (Ejdus and Božović 2016).  
The outburst of extreme violence was in the following years used by the government to 
engage in what can only be described as a securitisation process of the Pride, in which Pride 
was portrayed as an event that threatened Serbia’s national security. In the following three 
years, the state used the riots and security threats as an excuse to — in the words of a 
government official — “postpone”1 dealing with Pride, whilst focussing on other more 
important sensitive issues (e.g. Kosovo) and elections. This process and the three consecutive 
bans of the Belgrade Pride were, in part, made possible by the EU’s inconsistent pressure on 
Serbia. Indeed, whereas the EU considered the 2010 Pride a breakthrough in Serbia’s respect 
for human rights, the EU did not forcefully react to the Pride bans. In fact, following the 
rising tension between Serbia and Kosovo (with outbursts of violence in the summer of 
2011), the EU decided to prioritise regional stability over fundamental rights. As an EU 
official commented:  
Personally — and this is not the Commission’s position — I think we [the Commission] are being 
soft on Serbia on some issues [including Pride] because we want them to further cooperate. We 
want things to go well with Kosovo. […] It is always a political game […], so I think we are being 
soft on Serbia in the technical aspects because of this whole overarching political issue that is the 
relationship with Kosovo.2 
 
It was only after a landmark deal between Serbia and Kosovo was struck in March 2013 that 
the EU began to critique the Pride bans. Indeed, after the 2013 Pride ban, a shift in the EU’s 
language can be observed. For the first time, the Progress Report was much more direct and 
critical in its analysis of the Pride ban, highlighting “concerns regarding the lack of sufficient 
political support for the protection of the rights of LGBTI population” (European 
                                                      
1 Interview with an anonymous official from Ministry without Portfolio responsible for EU Integration, 12 
November 2015, London/Belgrade, mail interview. 
2 Interview with an anonymous official from European Commission (DG Enlargement), 6 March 2014, 
Brussels, face-to-face interview. 
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Commission 2013, 45). Whilst this explicit reference to the lack of political will might reflect 
a more coordinated approach to LGBT rights in the accession process, the EU did not follow 
through on the recent prioritisation of LGBT rights within the fundamental rights 
conditionality with concrete actions. Indeed, already back in June 2013, the EU decided to 
open the EU accession negotiations with Serbia conditioned on the implementation of the 
Brussels Agreements. In December 2013, the EU rewarded Serbia for its progress in 
reforming and efforts in improving its relations with Kosovo by setting a date for the start of 
the negations (Deutsche Welle 2013). 
Nevertheless, this change of EU’s tone marks the beginning of a new phase in the history of 
the Belgrade Pride. Contrary to the previous years, the 2014 Pride received much more 
political support. With the EU explicitly criticising the lack of political will to maintain Pride, 
and Serbia at the verge of opening the accession negotiations, the Serbian government had 
come to realise that maintaining the Belgrade Pride in 2014 would be considered a major 
litmus test for Serbia’s readiness for opening chapters. As such, the government perceived 
banning the Pride as an unnecessary risk to Serbia's progress in the EU accession process. 
Indeed, as two representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained in an interview, 
the EU had informally made clear that securing the Pride was seen as a condition for Serbia's 
advancement in the European integration process; i.e., Pride had become a litmus test for 
Serbia’s Europeanness. Consequently, the diplomats continued, the “EU had forced Serbia’s 
hand to have Pride,” disregarding the strong opinion amongst the government that the 
political reality was not opportune to have Pride.3 As such, the Minister of European 
Integration decided to get involved in the organisation of the Belgrade Pride, in order to 
avoid undue delays in Serbia’s accession process, and the Belgrade Pride returned without 
                                                      
3 Interview with anonymous officials from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 23 April 2015, 
Belgrade, face-to-face interview. 
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major incidents.   
To summarise the history of the Belgrade Pride, it can be said that Pride has been 
predominantly a product of domestic politics, which in interaction with the international 
politics of Pride have produced the political possibilities of both the bans and the successful 
events. The next section of the article analyses how the politics of Belgrade Pride have been 
transformed throughout history as a consequence of its specific transnational politics.   
 
The Belgrade ‘Ghost’ Pride as a Pathology of European Pressure 
Although the return of Belgrade Pride in 2014 was able to force the topic of LGBT issues 
into the public debate and forced the state authorities to recognise the presence of LGBT 
lives, these achievements have been partly hollowed out as a consequence of the 
transnational politics of the event and the homocolonialist process of triangulating of EU’s 
sexual exceptionalism through the promotion of and resistance to LGBT equality. I will 
discuss this process in two subsections. Whereas the first part focuses on the 
internationalisation and the local decoupling of Pride, the second section discusses the co-
optation of pride and the militarisation of pride. Although these four sub-processes are 
discussed separately, it is important to note that they are dynamic, interlinked and mutually 
reinforcing. 
 
Internationalisation and local decoupling of pride 
Already from the initial attempt, the Belgrade Pride has always been shaped by the 
international visibility of LGBT politics. For example, whilst the aim of the first Pride 
attempt in 2001 was to take a stand against the political and societal homophobia fostered by 
nationalist politics of the 1990s, it remains questionable whether it was indeed able to do to 
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so. Organised by a small (and arguably an elite) group of activists, the 2001 Pride enjoyed 
little support of a grassroots ‘community’4 and seemed rather detached from Serbian LGBT 
people and their grievances. One long-term activist noted that the 2001 Pride was not known 
by the ‘community’ nor by friendly civil society organisations. He highlighted that “the 
information about the first Pride was not public; it circulated between relatively few people.”5 
Hence, although some interpret the 2001 Pride as a symbolic coming out of LGBT issues in 
Serbia (Rhodes-Kubiak 2015, 124), what type of LGBT issues actually became visible might 
have been less localised than organisers had hoped for. Despite the fact that activists only 
cautiously invoked Europe as a reference point, opponents relied strongly on the international 
context, actively drawing attention to the readily available sexualised imagery of ‘Western’ 
Prides to take a stance against, what they called, the “spreading of unchristian immorality and 
perverse orgies” (in Djuric 2001). For example, one extremist opponent stated in a televised 
interview “This is not Berlin or Paris. This is Serbia. This kind of things does not happen here 
[…] these faggots, homosexuals and all that is going on against the Serbian people” (quoted 
in Bilić 2016b, 121). As such, the 2001 Pride was unable to create visibility of local LGBT 
people and their problems, and instead increased the visibility of that what it sought to 
challenge: the image of a ‘globalised gay identity’, that what opponents labelled 
‘homosexualism,' i.e., the idea that LGBT visibility and the Belgrade Pride are part of a 
Western attempt to destroy Serbian values.  
When it re-emerged in 2009, Belgrade Pride was once again caught in a similar dynamic of 
internationalisation and local decoupling. First, whereas LGBT issues remained rather non-
local after the 2001 Pride, the controversy associated with the adoption of the anti-
                                                      
4 The usage of the term community does not reflect the on the ground reality in Serbia — as an LGBT (political) 
community does not seem to exist. The term here should be read in relation to Pride’s Western origin which was 
rooted in an LGBT community that together rose up against oppression. 
5 Interview with Miloš Urošević, Women in Black, 14 September 2015, Belgrade, face-to-face interview. 
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discrimination law further cemented LGBT issues as an international topic. Indeed, both 
sides of the argument used a European argument to gain political support for or against the 
law: LGBT rights advocates relied heavily on EU (visa liberalisation) conditionality, while 
opponents framed the law as a (Western) attack on Serbian values. Despite the controversy 
associated with it, the ‘success’ of the European framing of the anti-discrimination law 
seemingly inspired both domestic and international actors to link the Belgrade Pride to the 
anti-discrimination law — as a first real test of the law. As such, maintaining the Pride 
became coupled to Serbia’s path to the EU; a testament of Serbia’s Europeanness. For 
example, Michael Cashman (Co-President of the European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT 
Rights) stated after the 2009 Pride ban that “Serbia [had] shown that it is not ready to become 
a member of the EU” (quoted in Wockner 2009). Similarly, in 2010, Western/European 
embassies considered the ‘successful’ Belgrade Pride an “example of [Serbia’s] embrace of 
Western, liberal values” (cited in Kirchick 2010). However, the externalisation of the Pride 
by prominent politicians as well as the EU’s use of Pride as a litmus test in response to the 
2009 Pride ban reinforced the delocalised visibility of Pride,6 as local LGBT lived 
experiences remain invisible.  
Consider, for example, the media reporting on the Belgrade Pride which has arguably 
contributed to the invisibility of local LGBT lives in two ways. First, whilst most articles on 
LGBT issues are published during the period leading up to and immediately following 
Belgrade Pride, coverage throughout the year increases the visibility of a globalised gay 
identity through its predominant reproduction of foreign LGBT news. Second, the reporting 
on the Belgrade Pride parade itself focused almost exclusively on the state response to 
security issues surrounding the Belgrade Pride, thereby “effectively stifling all other 
                                                      
6 This observation is in line with previous scholarship. For example, Bilić (2016b) has argued that Pride in 
Serbia is a reflection of the globalisation of gay identity, whilst Mikuš (2011) also highlighted how the 2010 
Pride Parade had a remarkable international, if not European, character.  
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discussion around the […] discrimination faced by members of LGBT communities and what 
can be done to counter it” (Igrutinović 2015, 63). Local LGBT lives, thus, are rendered 
invisible.  
The internationalisation and linkage of Pride with a ‘globalised gay identity,’ together with 
the lack of creating meaningful visibility of LGBT people’s lived experiences, arguably 
meant that the Belgrade Pride also lost its potential to engender an LGBT community in 
Serbia, as it has not (yet) been able to display a sense of mass solidarity that empowers others 
to come out (see Weeks 2015). Considering the imagery of the three successful Pride 
parades, it becomes clear that the “magical emotional impact” (Armstrong and Crage 2006, 
472) Prides are said to have never occurred. On the contrary, unable to create an inviting and 
supportive environment, the imagery of Pride rather aided the reproduction of violence and 
state oppression. To illustrate, in 2009, Belgrade was covered by graffiti threatening the Pride 
and LGBT people more generally (slogans included: We Are Waiting for You, and Death to 
Homosexuals). Whilst these threats remained present during the 2010 Pride, the bloodshed 
during the riots exemplified how real these threats are. Although such incidents did not occur 
in 2014 and 2015, the high level of securitisation — Pride only made possible through the 
deployment of an estimated 7,000 policemen in riot gear and armoured vehicles — arguably 
reinforced the idea that LGBT people are not safe in Serbia unless protected by police. 
Indeed, pictures of the 2014 and 2015 Pride demonstrate how the Pride took place in a 
‘security bubble,’ invisible for passers-by and impossible to join.  
More generally, it has been said that the increased framing of the Belgrade Pride as a litmus 
test for Serbia’s Europeanness by both domestic and international actors has put LGBT 
people at a greater risk of violence during the Pride parade period, without providing any 
sense of community and/or support. Indeed, as reported by the head of the community 
policing department during an interview, there is a yearly spike in hate crimes against LGBT 
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people in the period leading up to and following the Pride. The lack of without meaningful 
visibility of lived LGBT experiences, the persistent securitisation of the Pride combined with 
the discursive and visual linkage with violence, has been identified as the main reason for the 
growing disconnect between activists and the people they claim to represent, with LGBT 
people withdrawing from the idea of Pride.7 In fact, most participants of the 2010, 2014, and 
2015 Prides were predominantly international delegates — from international institutions and 
international human and LGBT rights civil society —, local civil society, political 
representatives and straight allies; local LGBT people remained a minority. Aleksandar Prica, 
an activist from outside Belgrade, eloquently explains the disconnect between Pride and the 
local LGBT population: 
Generally, LGBT persons have much more problems during the Pride and during the time when 
Pride is being organised than during the entire year […]. When the Pride is cancelled, a message is 
sent to the LGBT people that the state cannot protect them. LGBT people […] simply don’t want 
Pride.8 
 
Not only has the local LGBT population withdrawn from the Belgrade Pride, but the reverse 
process can also be observed. Indeed, the complicated history of the Pride has pushed Pride 
organisers away from engaging with LGBT people. Whilst Belgrade Pride has always had an 
elitist character — or as Boban Stojanović, a key Pride organiser, admits: “[Pride] does not 
come from the need of the community. It comes from some exclusive knowledge of 
individuals” —,9 this only intensified when the organisation of Pride became fraught with 
uncertainty and bans. In order to have Pride, organisers reportedly spend over 90 percent of 
their time in communication with state representatives and the international community, with 
little resources left to engage LGBT people. By doing so, the already weak link with the 
‘community’ was further severed, as “only the activist circles [seem to] know the point of 
                                                      
7 For a more detailed study on why LGBT people have withdrawn from the Belgrade Pride, see Stojčić (2014). 
8 Interview with Aleksandar Prica, Asocijаcijа DUGA, 30 April 2015, Šabac, face-to-face interview. 
9 Interview with Slobodan (Boban) Stojanović, Belgrade Pride, 23 September 2015, Belgrade, face-to-face 
interview. 
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Pride. LGBT people do not [know] because nobody is practically working with them on that 
issue, to explain what is the Pride and why Pride matters.”10 Indeed, Boban Stojanović 
concurs:  
Our idea was to have the community more involved, but with the banning [of Pride] it was not a 
priority. The Pride bans brought something new: to have Pride as a form, as an event. [With the 
bans in] 2011, 2012, and 2013 […] there was not much space for community work. […] You can 
have a campaign in which you explain what you want, why [Pride] is important, etc., but in those 
several years, it was almost impossible […] because there is this other, bigger discussion: Pride, 
yes or no? Pride, safe or not? Pride, ban or not?11 
 
Although non-organising activists recognise these political conditions created by the bans, 
they nevertheless seem to hold Pride organisers partly responsible for the disconnect with the 
LGBT population, especially highlighting their poor communication with the ‘community’ 
and activist scene. As one activist eloquently describes:  
They [Pride organisers] need to talk to the community more. They need a link with the 
community. […] [they] need to have some point where people can connect with, and that is the 
problem with Pride. If [good communication] is there, it will happen, but I have no idea what is 
happening. As part of the community, as an activist and part of the community, I have no idea 
what is happening [in the Pride week and with the parade].12 
  
Another often mentioned reason for the disconnect between Pride organisers and the wider 
‘community’ is the discursive shift towards a (human) rights-based framing, which made 
Pride a goal rather than a tool. Indeed, whereas the 2009 Pride was framed as “a political 
protest, a procession in which one marginalised group in society […] becomes visible and 
contributes to the respect for human rights” (Dragana Vučković quoted in Beta 2009), the 
cancellation/ban of that Pride firmly positioned the Belgrade Pride within the human rights 
discourse. Faced with the impossibility of having Pride, organisers indicated that, from 2010 
onwards, they were increasingly framed the Pride as the expression of LGBT people’s 
                                                      
10 Interview with Aleksandar Prica, Asocijаcijа DUGA, 30 April 2015, Sabac, face-to-face interview. 
11 Interview with Slobodan (Boban) Stojanović, Belgrade Pride, 23 September 2015, Belgrade, face-to-face 
interview. 
12 Interview with anonymous activist from Gayten-LGBT, 18 May 2015, Belgrade, face-to-face interview. 
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(constitutional and human) right to freedom of assembly. The international attention for Pride 
only strengthened that shift, as the international community responded to the Pride bans by 
reminding Serbia of its responsibility to guarantee the exercise of freedom of assembly. 
Indeed, for the EU, Pride is a “question of freedom of expression, [and] freedom of 
assembly.”13 In fact, as there is no EU standard on Pride parades (i.e., not all Member States 
have Pride events), the only way in which the EU can pressure Serbia to maintain the Pride 
parade is by emphasising freedom of assembly. With activists perceiving European 
arguments the only successful approach to the Serbian government, Pride organisers were 
further encouraged to align themselves with the international human rights frame and made 
Pride, as many attest, a goal in itself. Moreover, the human rights framework remained rather 
unchallenged as ‘successful’ Prides are considered progress, with neither organisers nor 
international community asking more critical questions about the quality of Pride and how it 
contributes to improving lived experiences of local LGBT people. In fact, some activists have 
argued that the almost exclusive focus of the EU on Pride has seemingly given the impression 
the LGBT lives are reducible to this one event. In her critical blog post, queer activist Lazara 
Marinković (2015 original emphasis) highlights the problematic of the international 
overemphasising of the successfulness of Pride:  
we can conclude that Belgrade Pride March 2014 didn’t bring any positive social change at all. 
[…] Further more [sic], Serbia’s example of Belgrade Pride Parade was used in the OSCE/ODIHR 
conference on freedom of assembly as an example of good practice, disregarding the overall status 
of the LGBT people and freedom of assembly in Serbia, which [are] both deteriorating. 
 
The Co-optation and Militarisation of Pride 
The detachment from the people Pride claims to represent as well as its ‘litmus test-isation’ 
raises important questions about the ownership of Pride; as Marko Karadžić suggests:  
                                                      
13 Interview with an anonymous official from European Commission (DG Enlargement), 30 July 2013, Brussels, 
face-to-face interview. 
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What I really dislike about the policy coming from the European Union is that the [progress] 
reports are praising the events which are not actually a step forward. […] the message that has to 
be communicated after the Pride, I believe, has to be different from the one that we have. First of 
all, we do not have one. The messages sent after the 2010 Pride and even the last one [2014] were: 
“The state and politicians are not against us [LGBT people], because the EU pressures [Serbia] for 
these ‘faggots’ to get together,” and then “it is a huge step because we had [Pride]”, but the 
question one should ask is: “who had it [Pride]? A few NGO activists, the EU ambassadors and 
5,000 policemen, in order to write a good report so that the EU can tell that there is good progress 
in Serbia?”14 (emphasis added) 
 
Karadžić’s question of ‘who had Pride?’ is indeed a critical issue to consider. If Pride is not 
for and/or by LGBT people, then for whom and by whom is the Pride organised, and why? 
Although it is undeniable that the organisation of Pride in Serbia has forced (some) state 
institutions — especially the police — to recognise LGBT people as citizens, the same cannot 
necessarily be said about the Serbian government. Increasing EU pressure may have “forced 
the government’s hand” to deal with Pride,15 but the inconsistency of this pressure, combined 
with the earlier described ‘hollowing out’ of Pride as an activist tool, allowed for the 
transformation of Pride. There is a strong consensus amongst activists — Pride organisers 
and non-organisers alike — that politicians have co-opted Pride as their political tool. The 
first signs of such political appropriation already emerged during the organisation process of 
the 2010 Pride, now commonly referred to as the ‘State Pride’ (Mikuš 2011). Indeed, as the 
government came to realise that a ‘successful’ 2010 Pride would demonstrate Serbia’s 
commitment to the EU integration project, the state became actively involved in organising 
Pride. Whilst organisers took advantage of this situation to have Pride, others feared that this 
political alliance would come at a steep price. Indeed, as one long-term feminist activist 
noted in a discussion on the 2010 Pride:  
It seems to me that the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian Progressive Party are planning to 
hijack our forms, render them meaningless, empty them from their political content... and then 
simply throw them away... the sole purpose of all of this is meeting “the standards” [European 
                                                      
14 Interview with Marko Karadžić, Former State Secretary of the Minister for Human and Minority Rights, 29 
April 2015, Belgrade/DC, Skype interview. 
15 Interview with anonymous officials from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 23 April 
2015, Belgrade, face-to-face interview. 
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Union conditions]... this has nothing to do with our needs, but it is something which is asked from 
them... they are asked for Kosovo and they are asked for this (Pride). (quoted in Bilić 2016b, 135) 
 
In the years to follow, this fear seemed to be well-founded as the state-condoned violence16 
that accompanied the 2010 Pride provided politicians with the perfect excuse to withdraw 
their public support for LGBT equality and the Pride in particular. Politicians were quick to 
blame the LGBT activists’ provocative Pride and the EU pressure for the destruction of 
Belgrade (see Slootmaeckers 2016). Moreover, as the international community —particularly 
the EU— strategically decided to focus on the success of the Pride and congratulated the state 
for maintaining the event, a message was sent to politicians that Pride could be strategically 
used as a pragmatic ‘homonationalist tool’ with the aim to formally fulfil the EU’s accession 
conditions. 
An additional benefit of the riots for the government was that it provided an excuse to push 
the LGBT issues off the political agenda. Indeed, in a period of political instability in which 
organising Pride would be too costly, the government used security reasons as a pretext to 
ban the Pride, thereby ‘postponing’ dealing with Pride until the (new) government 
sufficiently consolidated its power. Until the latter happened, it was more beneficial for the 
government to ban the Pride. Indeed, Perunović (2015, 82) convincingly argued that the Pride 
bans were an opportunity for the Serbian government to exercise its sovereignty with the goal 
to reinforce its power position “under the guise of its protective role (paradoxically impotent 
and omnipotent at the same time).” By banning the Pride as well as by focusing on its 
security aspects, the government further pushed the Belgrade Pride into the human rights 
                                                      
16 The riots can be described as state-condoned as the police efforts to prevent the riots were rather limited. In 
the name of police impartiality, opponents of the Pride were given ample opportunities to protest against the 
Pride and organise for the riots. 
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frame, and thereby, albeit unintentionally, depoliticised the Pride as an activist tool.17 Thus, 
the Pride bans contributed to a transfer of ownership over the Pride: from LGBT activists to 
the state.18 As such, it can be argued that “Pride is [no longer] organised by civil society 
organisations, but by politicians,”19 or as activists critically observe:  
Pride as Pride is insignificant; it is not important. But it is a tool for political parties for their 
political fights. Because on the issue of Pride, you will have fights between so-called left and 
right; anti-EU and pro-EU: against Russia and for Russia parties. […] You will have a clash of 
many people that are not LGBT on the issue of Pride, and we [LGTB people] are collateral 
damage. […] It is interesting that pro and against, all those cases do not value the LGBT issue 
because they [politicians] are fighting their fights, they are not thinking about us;20 
 
[As such, Pride] is just a matter of PR. The government wants to appear as having European 
oriented values, which I have to say is crap because it is not genuine and not sincere and that is 
why [Pride] happened last year [2014]. […] It is a tool of politicians. And what I am mad about is 
that those organisations with the explanation that it is better to have something than nothing, they 
are excepting it.21  
 
When the Pride returned to Belgrade in 2014, it was arguably again the government 
(particularly Vučić) that stood most to gain. Playing on the organisers’ desperation to 
exercise their freedom of assembly, Vučić used Pride as a move to align with EU’s 
expectations, a tool to bolster his (inter)national image as a reforming Pro-EU force and to 
highlight his capacity to enforce the Serbia’s constitution. For example, the highly militarised 
imagery of the Pride is said to have helped Vučić — as personification of the state — to 
demonstrate that “the [state/ Vučić’s government] is incontestable in its protective role and 
[that] its [political] will is not to be contested anymore” (Perunović 2015, 82).22 Moreover, by 
                                                      
17 (Then) Prime Minister Vučić’s characterisation of Pride as a “leisurely walk” in 2014 perfectly illustrate this 
depoliticisation. 
18 This transfer of ownership is further aided by the increasing conflict between LGBT organisation about the 
usefulness of Pride, and the what some perceive as the hegemonisation of the Pride by the current organisers, 
who not only have become disconnected from the LGBT people, but also from the activist community. 
19 Interview with Aleksandar Prica, Asocijаcijа DUGA, 30 April 2015, Šabac, face-to-face interview. 
20 Interview with Predrag Azdejković, Gay Lesbian Info Center, 02 June 2014, Belgrade, face-to-face interview. 
21 Interview with Igor Vojvodić, a former activist from Gay Straight Alliance, 10 May 2015, Belgrade, face-to-
face interview. 
22 This reference to the government’s political will has to be read in relation to the explicit reference to the lack 
of political will to organise Pride in the EU’s 2013 progress report. 
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militarising the Pride, Vučić transformed the ‘State Pride’ into a ‘Ghost Pride,’23 i.e., a state 
tolerated manifestation of Pride which remains invisible to the wider public.24 The security 
perimeter — officially created to protect Pride participants — has a secondary function of a 
“transparent closet” (Kuhar 2011) that keeps LGBT people’s visibility invisible and outside 
the public sphere. Apart from this physical appearance, the transparent closet also exists 
discursively. As already mentioned, the explicit media focus on Pride’s security aspects and 
potential bans has contributed to the discursive invisibility of LGBT lived experiences and 
grievances. In other words, by securitising Pride, LGBT visibility is kept to a minimum, i.e., 
a ritualistic (“leisurely”) walk through the city devoid of politics. Anita Mitić (Pride 
organiser) explains how she feels that the state and the police are  
demonstrating their power much more than they are protecting us. […] Like they are exactly 
isolating us and protecting us in the same way, because I feel that sometimes [with Pride and other 
street actions] they [the police] always come, so many of them and you are like ‘is this really 
necessary?’ You are surrounded by police, no one can pass you, and you do not have any kind of 
contact with the population, there is you, the circle of police and the rest of the world.25  
 
Although the political appropriation of Pride aimed at ‘closeting’ the visibility politics of the 
event cannot be denied, the organisers’ complicity in this development cannot go unnoticed. 
Indeed, non-organising LGBT activists and former activists have argued that as Pride 
developed into a goal in itself, disconnected from the ‘community,’ organisers’ representation 
of Pride added to the ‘closeting’ of LGBT people. For example, it has been pointed out that 
organisers are “always explaining and elaborating very very strongly that nobody should 
worry, that Pride is not going to be as it is in San Francisco, that nobody is going to be naked 
                                                      
23 Interview with Maja Mičić, YiHR – Youth Initiative for Human Rights / Former Pride Organiser, 30 October 
2015, London/Belgrade, Skype interview. 
24 Or as Brown (2006, 98-99) writes: “the tolerance [for the gay Pride] the state urges on the citizenry is secured 
through our averted glance, by kind of visual privatisation that is a ghostly repetition of the actual privatisation 
of sexuality required if homosexuals are to be tolerated at all.” 
25 Interview with Anita Mitić, Youth Initiative for Human Rights, 18 May 2015, Belgrade, face-to-face 
interview. 
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as if that is something that should not happen,”26 in an attempt to make Pride less publicly 
contested as well as to reduce the connection with the ‘international gay identity.’ By doing 
so, the argument goes, organisers are “trying to prepare everybody that it is going to be a very 
composed and controlled Pride where gay people are just going to walk,” and thus reducing 
the possibility of LGBT people to express their lived experiences (emphasis added).27 
Similarly, in 2013, Pride organisers actively decided to turn a blind eye to the homophobic 
comments of then Prime Minister Dačić (for the statement see Ejdus and Božović 2016, 13), 
as they assumed these comments were made in order to please his (nationalist) support base, 
whilst still allowing Pride. Indeed, talking about the 2013 Pride ban, a former Pride organiser 
questions whether they did not make too many compromises to make Pride happen.  
I was ashamed because, in that moment, I thought we compromised a lot for the Pride to happen. 
We did not react so forcefully when Ivica Dačić made homophobic statements because we did not 
want to make a big fuss because if he allows Pride, then it is OK, and we expected Pride to 
happen. […] It was a difficult pill to swallow, but I was like, ‘OK, if we have Pride, then it was 
worth it.’ We were all aware of the compromise, we were all disgusted with everything that was 
happening, but you wanted to try not the attack him. We also thought that that was part of his 
rhetoric, so he will allow the Pride since he is trying to keep the constituency covered from all 
angles. (emphasis added)28  
 
Similarly, Predrag Azdejković critically observes that Pride organisers, and the activist 
community more generally, have become too complicit in the appropriation of LGBT issues 
to demonstrate Serbia’s Europeanness:  
It is interesting that we do not have the balls to be anti-government. If we are anti-government, 
next year we will not have Pride because we have Pride only when the government says so. […] 
We do not need the Pride for to build a better government and better relations between the EU and 
the government. If we cannot be critical, and we are censoring ourselves only so that the 
government can say “you can have Pride,” I don’t see the point. It is better not to have Pride or to 
create that false image of Serbia being a tolerant country. No, we are not. Why are we [as 
activists] playing that game?29 
                                                      
26 Interview with Igor Vojvodić, a former activist from Gay Straight Alliance, 10 May 2015, Belgrade, face-to-
face interview. 
27 Interview with Igor Vojvodić, a former activist from Gay Straight Alliance, 10 May 2015, Belgrade, face-to-
face interview. 
28 Interview with Maja Mičić, YiHR – Youth Initiative for Human Rights / Former Pride Organiser, 30 October 
2015, London/Belgrade, Skype interview. 
29 Interview Predrag Azdejković, Gay Lesbian Info Center / Organiser Trans* Pride, 23 September 2015, 




Following Ammaturo’s (2017) claim that linking LGBT rights that the appealing idea of 
Europe is a harmful action, this article sought to challenge the EU’s practice of using Pride 
parades as a litmus test for Europeanness in the enlargement process (so-called pink-testing) 
and to analyse the political outcomes such practice produces. Introducing a transnational 
perspective, this article moved away from a top-down analysis in which the EU’s domestic 
impact on LGBT rights is being evaluated towards an analysis of how to configuration of 
international and national politics shapes domestic LGBT politics. By doing so, the analysis 
aligned itself with queer scholars’ call to counter the reproduction of a hegemonic Western 
matrix as part of the globalisation of sexual identity politics (see e.g. Ammaturo 2017; 
Stychin 2004). Indeed, drawing on Rahman’s (2014) work on homocolonialism, this article 
provided a much-needed challenge to the presumed universality of Pride as a visibility-
raising strategy. It does so by highlighting that embedded Prides in wider international 
(civilisational) politics can have serious political implications. Indeed, the findings clearly 
demonstrate the EU’s homocolonialist practice of what Rahman (2014, 281) calls ‘pink-
testing’, combined with the domestic resistance to this has had a harmful impact on local 
LGBT people and politics. Whereas using Pride as a litmus test for Europeanness has led to a 
politicisation of the issue on the international level, it also allowed for the transformation of 
Pride’s national politics. Over the years, Belgrade Pride has been co-opted by the state to 
demonstrate Europeanness towards the EU, whilst the militarisation of the event created a 
‘Ghost Pride,’ a state-tolerated manifestation of Pride which takes place in a militarised 
‘transparent closet’ that keeps LGBT people’s visibility strategies invisible and outside the 
public sphere, reinforcing traditional and nationalist conceptions of Serbian society. 
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Moreover, the intertwining of international and domestic politics surrounding the Belgrade 
Pride made that LGBT activists, and Pride organisers in particular, came to occupy a rather 
impossible position caught between national and European politics, with limited room to 
escape the homocolonialist implications of the EU’s pink-testing. This being the case, 
Serbian Pride organisers opted to align themselves with the attractive idea of Europeanness in 
order to allow Pride to happen as an event. Indeed, with the aim to overcome the bans but 
also to increase the saliency of the issue, they framed the Pride as an expression of the 
universal human right of freedom of assembly, linking it discursively to the European 
integration process. Although the internationalisation of the Pride helped to make Pride 
possible from 2014 onwards, this strategy also backfired as it led to the domestic 
depoliticisation of Pride. Increasingly decoupled from its local constituency, without 
sufficient support from its grassroots and with a strong reliance on the apolitical human rights 
discourses, Pride became a form of activism, an outcome rather than a tool to achieve change 
and devoid of LGBT politics. 
The presented findings also have important implications for the Europeanisation of LGBT 
rights literature. Similar to the work of Bilić (2016a; 2016b), the article has challenged the 
prevailing notion that the EU accession process has been a force of good for post-Yugoslav 
LGBT rights and provides a more critical understanding of how the transnational LGBT 
politics shape LGBT politics in the region. However, the presented analysis furthers Bilić’s 
analysis by arguing that the local disconnect of the Pride with the ‘community’ and the 
absence of a political agenda is not just due to the EU’s imperial-like LGBT rights 
conditionality, but is also the result of the limitations in opportunities for local LGBT 
activisms produced by transnational character of LGBT politics. Indeed, it is argued that it 
was a complex feedback loop of domestic and international LGBT politics that produced 
critical challenges for activisms which, in turn, limited the politicality of the Belgrade Pride. 
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As long as activists are caught in the liminal position between the EU and the national 
(within the East-West dynamic), developing a locally-grounded version of Pride might prove 
to be difficult, yet not necessarily impossible.  
The article also raises important questions related the more general Europeanisation 
literature. Through the transnational analysis presented in this research, it is suggested that 
the EU enlargement process should be thought of as a political process where the 
intertwining of domestic and international politics together produces outcomes which the 
dominant approaches in the Europeanisation literature cannot fully explain. Indeed, rather 
than analysing the domestic impact of the EU in candidate countries, this article has shown 
that it is through the particular usage of LGBT rights within the transnational context and the 
interaction between domestic and international politics that the meaning of the LGBT 
equality norms and Pride in particular has been re-interpreted. Thus, extending the 
‘pathological turn’ in the Europeanisation literature (see Mendelski 2016), this article has 
demonstrated that instrumentalisation and politicisation of reforms is not only the result of 
the EU’s flawed outcome-focussed monitoring system, but is also a product of the particular 
configuration of international and national politics.  
In sum, these presented findings call for a more critical analysis of the civilisational politics 
embedded in the EU enlargement process (but also the Eastern Partnership, for example, in 
relation to Kyiv Pride) — whether it be in LGBT rights or other fields — that goes beyond 
tracing institutional changes to include the specific transnational configurations of politics 
and the complexities and outcomes these produce.  
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Figure 1. Historical overview of Belgrade Pride between 2000 and 2015 
 
 
 
